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Has the Fed Given Up? 
The answer is, "Certainly not." Those pundits 
who have interpreted the steep decline in 
interest rates as a Federal Reserve surrender 
to inflation have somehow missed the 
message of the Fed's October 6 policy shift. 
(They probably haven't paid any attention 
either to Milton Friedman's Newsweek 
columns over the past decade or so.) The real 
story is that the Fed has consistently pursued 
the same money-growth objectives since last 
fall. But in the process, interest rates have 
swung widely in both directions, reflecting 
(among other things) the Fed's increased 
emphasis on money growth rather than 
interest rates in its operating processes. 
Without doubt, interest-rate movements have 
been unprecedented in recent months. 
Treasury-bi II rates, for example, rose from 
a 1  0.2-percent average rate last September 
to a 15.5-percent average rate in the month 
of March, before dropping to 8.8 percent 
in early May. And the prime business loan 
rate, after rising to 13 V2  percent on the eve 
of the Fed's October pol icy action, jumped 
to 20 percent this April before declining 
to the present level of 16  V2  percent. But these 
massive rate movements, far from indicating 
monetary-policy shifts, rather have indicated 
wide shifts in loan demand, as well as 
slowness by market participants in adjusting 
to a new market envi ronment. 
By improving its control over bank reserves in 
the past half year, the Federal Reserve has 
managed to reduce money-supply growth 
roughly by half. In the two quarters prior to 
the October 6 policy shift, the M-1 B measure 
of the money supply increased at about an 
11-percent annual rate. (M-l B consists of 
currency, plus bank demand deposits, plus 
similar check-type deposits at other financial 
institutions.) In the following two quarters, 
the growth rate dropped to about a 5 %-per-
cent annual rate. Then, in the present quarter 
to date, the money supply has actually 
declined. The recent data indicate, not 
a worrisome easing of policy, but rather 
a danger of excessive tightening. 
Money growth and inflation 
To put this problem in the proper context 
we should understand the connection 
between money growth and inflation, and the 
reasons why the Federal Reserve shifted its 
operating techniques last fall to fight inflation 
more effectively. Most economists agree that 
over the long run, the fundamental 
determinant of the rate of inflation is the rate 
of growth of the money supply. Monetary 
growth greater than that which is required to 
meet the needs of trade and finance wi  II 
ultimately result in higher prices (see chart). 
However, it takes approximately two years 
for most of the effects of an increase in the 
money supply to work their way through the 
economy to price increases. 
Although the relationship is not perfect, there 
is a general correspondence between the 
U.S. rate of inflation and U.S. monetary 
growth two years earlier. This relationship 
can be expected to hold in the long run, 
while in the short run, inflation may also 
be influenced by non-monetary factors such 
as oil-price shocks, crop failures, and 
price controls. 
Between the first quarter of 1979 and the first 
quarter of 1980, the price index (deflator) for 
personal consumption expenditures rose 
by 10.3 percent. What factors accounted for 
such a sharp increase? One important factor 
was the oil-price shock of 1979. Due 
primari Iy to OPEC oi I-price increases, energy 
prices in the U.S. rose by almost 40 percent in 
1979. This contributed significantly to the 
past year's rise in the overall price level, and 
the effects may continue as the energy price 
increases work their way through to prices of 
related products. Nonetheless, the oil-price 
shock has added no more than two per-
centage points to the inflation rate over the 
last year. This still leaves us with a high ke::;crve  ~i\i\tern. 
underlying rate of inflation, which is 
explainable in terms of the past history of 
monetary growth. 
Annual money growth averaged about 
3 percent in the early 19f)O's, but averaged 
over 8 percent between early 1977 and late 
1979. What has caused this excessive money 
growth? And if excessive monetary 
expansion is the root cause of inflation, 
why doesn't the Federal Reserve System 
simply adopt more conservative policies and 
aim at a slower growth of money and credit? 
Excessive growth (I) 
After the end of World War II, many 
countries, including the United States, 
adopted national economic pol icies aimed 
vigorously at full employment. This is 
understandable in the context of the 
economic and human ravages of the Great 
Depression and the Great War. Later on, the 
full-employment goal was augmented by 
programs of social welfare and income 
maintenance. These goals were achieved 
largely through greatly enlarged government 
spending programs. 
While the programs themselves were 
popular, an increase in taxes to finance these 
programs was far less popular, and the result 
has been chronic large-scale deficit 
financing. When economic resources are 
substantially under-utilized, it c.an be 
constructive to achieve fiscal and monetary 
stimulus through well-designed government 
spending programs, financed through budget 
deficits and/or an accompariying increased 
growth of money and credit. However, the 
U.S. has recorded federal budget deficits in 
19 of the last 20 years, irrespective of the 
stage of the business cycle. 
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Because of strong public pressures to keep 
interest rates as low as  is consistent with 
short-term economic growth, and because 
of the operating procedures which were 
in place until last October 6, the Fed 
in the past tended to use nev,t!y-created 
money to purchase a large portion of the 
bonds floated by the Treasury to finance the 
deficit. This process-monetizing the 
deficit -may be explained by the different 
effects of expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policy on domestic interest rates. 
If the government sells bonds to pay for an 
increase in the Federal deficit (expansionary 
fiscal policy), this will increase the supply of 
bonds available to the public, and will put 
upward pressure on interest rates. On the 
other hand, if the Fed increases the supply of 
money (expansionary monetary policy) by 
buying bonds on the open market, this will 
reduce the supply of bonds available to the 
public, and will put downward pressure (at 
least in the short run) on interest rates. 
Higher interest rates impact heavily on 
businesses, farmers, homebuilders and 
state-and-Iocal government units. To avoid 
such problems, the Fed sometimes has had 
a tendency to buy all of the additional bonds 
sold by the Treasury, leaving no change in the 
supply of bonds available to the public, and 
no immediate change in interest rates. Thus, 
in times of large increases in Federal deficits, 
such as  in the Vietnam War era, the Fed has 
.  tended to monetize the deficit and thus 
increase the supply of money beyond what 
it otherwise would have been. 
Excessive growth (II) 
Secondly, high money growth has occurred 
because of uncertainty regarding the effects 
of monetary policy. Expanding money 
growth increases production in the short run, 
but increases the inflation rate in the long run. 
Similarly, while a deceleration in money 
growth leads to an eventual decline in the 
inflation rate, the immediate effects are 
negative-an increase in unemployment and 
a reduction in real output. While the central 
bank has a responsibility to strive for Change(%) 
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non-inflationary economic growth, it also has 
a responsibility to avoid policies which 
produce sub-normal growth and excessive 
unused resou rces. 
Because of the uncertainties of economic 
forecasting, however, there is almost always 
a large "gray area" in the range of 
appropriate monetary policy, no matter 
how clear the proper pol icy may appear 
in retrospect to economic historians. Because 
of such uncertainties, and because the short-
run effects of policy are sometimes weighted 
more heavily than the long-run effects, there 
is often a tendency to err on the side of 
monetary ease. The result frequently is 
a favorable short-run impact on employment 
and output, but a worsening of the inflation 
rate in the long run. 
Excessive growth (III) 
The third reason for the high monetary 
growth of the last decade has to do with the 
operating procedures of the Federal 
Reserve-the way in which money was 
injected into the economy-prior to 
October 6,  1979. Under that procedure, 
the Fed's policy-making committee, the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMe), 
chose an appropriate rate of money growth, 
and then chose a short-term interest-rate 
target (the Federal funds rate) which 
appeared to be consistent with the targeted 
rate of money growth. If the Fed funds rate 
rose above the chosen rate, the Fed would 
purchase securities with newly created 
money, putting downward pressure on short-
term interest rates. Similarly, if  the Fed funds 
rate fell below the chosen rate, the Fed wou  Id 
sell securities, thus withdrawing money from 
the system and pushing rates back up. 
This procedure created problems, however, 
because of the FOMes reluctance, in prac-
tice, to change its targeted interest rate. 
Interest rates can be affected by factors other 
than monetary policy, so that a policy which 
tries to fight such changes wi  II  result in 
monetary growth different from intended. 
During a cyclical expansion, for example, 
interest rates tend to rise for reasons not 
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directly related to current monetary policy, 
such as increases in private-sector investment 
demand and increases in inflation expecta-
tions. The Fed consequently would feel 
forced to buy additional securities, thus 
increasing the supply of money, in order to 
keep interest rates at their targeted level. 
The old operating procedures, coupled with 
reluctance to change the short-term interest 
rate, thus led to a procyclical monetary 
policy. In other words, we experienced 
an overexpansion of the money supply 
during economic booms, and underexpan-
sion of the money supply during ~conomic 
slowdowns. And since most years in the past 
two decades have been expansion years, this 
situation has led to a net overexpansion of the 
money supply. 
The new operating procedures should avoid 
these problems. As we've seen, the Fed now 
allows short-term interest rates to fluctuate 
much more than before, and concentrates 
instead on controlling directly the amount 
of reserves in the banking system. Because 
banks hold a fairly stable amount of reserves 
relative to total deposits, this new procedure 
should improve monetary control and pre-
vent some of the excesses which occurred 
in the past. Indeed, these procedures seem 
to be working, as was noted at the outset. 
Looking ahead, it is apparent that the 
problem of inflation will not be solved over-
night, because it has built up over a number 
of years. The Federal Reserve is determined 
to reduce, gradually yet consistently, the rate 
of growth of the money supply. Despite the 
time required to make this policy completely 
effective, it is the necessary solution for bring-
ing down the rate of inflation in this country. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Amount 
Outstanding 
4/30/80 
138,394 
116,690 
33,749 
46,079 
24,314 
1,123 
6,391 
15,313 
43,921 
31,085 
25,904 
64,517 
55,610 
23,225 
Change 
from 
4/23/80 
+  39 
+  127 
+  52 
+  116 
105 
+  1n 
- 150 
+  62 
+  670 
-1,141 
- 318 
+  588 
+  541 
+  441 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
12,885  +  10.3 
14,037  +  13.7 
2,949  +  9.6 
9,095  +  24.6 
2,616  +  12.1 
447  1- 28.5 
1,346  - 17.4 
194  +  1.3 
1,175  +  2.7 
406  +  1.3 
3,838  - 12.9 
+  14,703  +  29.5 
+  15,128  +  37.4 
+  6,164  +  36.1 
Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended  Comparable 
of Daily figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  +  )/Net borrowed  (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
4/30/80 
331 
88 
243 
4/23/80  year-ago period 
479  10 
148  224 
331  214 
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